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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge 
 Jerry Whitfield entered a conditional guilty plea to one 
count of felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Under the terms of the plea, he reserved 
his right to appeal the District Court’s denial of his motion to 
suppress. That appeal is now before us. We will affirm.  
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 Whitfield filed a motion to suppress a gun and other 
evidence that emanated from his arrest on April 30, 2008. The 
evidentiary hearing on that motion spanned two days, and 
included testimony from three police officers, Whitfield’s 
girlfriend, Raheem Langston (a friend of Whitfield’s who was 
with him on April 30, 2008 and whom police also detained), 
and Whitfield’s investigator. The District Court found the 
police officers’ testimony to be credible and did not credit 
Langston’s testimony.1 Importantly, the Court made factual 
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1 The testimony of Whitfield’s girlfriend and 
investigator are not central to the issue he raises on appeal.  
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findings that Whitfield does not challenge before us.  
 
 Given that we write only for the parties, a brief 
summary of the facts will suffice. Around 9:30 p.m. on April 
30, 2008, four Camden, New Jersey, police officers in three 
marked police cars were patrolling a residential street in an 
area of Camden known for violence and drug activity, 
particularly crack sales. The cars were traveling in a 
“caravan,” so that all three cars were in a line moving down 
the street, with Officers Figueroa and Torres in the first car, 
Officer Redd in the second, and Sergeant Rivera in the third. 
The officers were on “supplemental patrol,” which Redd 
described as “proactive work . . . in target areas, like hot spots 
in the city, as far as drug corners [and] gun calls,” and were 
not responding to any particular complaint nor did they have 
any information about Whitfield at that time. (R. at 46.) 
 
The caravan was approaching a corner that the officers 
knew was a “drug set,” or an area known for drug sales. (Id. 
at 48.) Figueroa and Torres radioed that two people were 
standing on the right having a conversation. They did this to 
“give a view of what [the other officers were] coming up on 
so that they, [were] alert to what is going on in the block.” 
(Id. at 124.) From the second car, Redd saw two men, later 
identified as Whitfield and Langston, surreptitiously 
exchange something and quickly walk away.  Redd did not 
tell the other officers that he saw this hand-to-hand exchange, 
but radioed, “check these two guys out on the corner.” (Id. at 
73.) The officers all stopped their cars, and Redd got out and 
went to the sidewalk. Rivera heard someone say over the 
radio that one of the men was coming toward him, and he got 
out of his car, too.  
 
At some point, either right after the hand-to-hand 
exchange or as Whitfield walked toward Redd and Rivera, the 
officers saw him “put his hand in his pocket real quick” and 
believed that he was holding something. (Id. at 51.) Both 
officers repeatedly ordered him to take his hand out of his 
pocket, and drew their weapons. He did not comply with their 
orders, and continued to walk toward Redd. Redd thought 
Whitfield was “looking around like looking to escape.” (Id. at 
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52.)  
 
Rivera was between Whitfield and Redd, and when 
Whitfield got close to Rivera, Rivera holstered his gun, 
“grabbed” Whitfield, and “dragged” him toward a police car. 
(Id. at 116-17.) When Whitfield said that he had a gun, Redd 
“rushed up” and pulled Whitfield’s hand out of his pocket. 
(Id. at 53.) The gun was recovered, and Whitfield was 
arrested.  
 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
Our review of the District Court’s determination that there 
was reasonable suspicion to seize Whitfield and, thus, that the 
motion to suppress should be denied, is plenary. Ornelas v. 
United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996) (“as a general matter 
determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause 
should be reviewed de novo on appeal,” but factual findings 
should be reviewed for clear error).   
 
III. ANALYSIS 
 A. Legal Framework 
When a police officer has “a reasonable, articulable 
suspicion that criminal activity is afoot,” he or she may 
conduct a “brief, investigatory stop.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 
U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (discussing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 
(1968)). “Reasonable suspicion” requires less than probable 
cause, but there must be “at least a minimal level of objective 
justification for making the stop.” Id. In determining whether 
there was reasonable suspicion, we consider the totality of the 
circumstances, i.e., “the whole picture.” United States v. 
Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981). Among the “pertinent 
factor[s]” that an officer may consider are whether the area is 
a high-crime area, a suspect’s “nervous, evasive behavior,” 
and flight from police officers. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124. It 
is not necessary that the suspect actually have done or is 
doing anything illegal; reasonable suspicion may be “based 
on acts capable of innocent explanation.” United States v. 
5 
 
                                                
Valentine, 232 F.3d 350, 356 (3d Cir. 2000). The 
circumstances, however, “must raise a suspicion that the 
particular individual being stopped is engaged in 
wrongdoing.” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 
(1981). Reasonable suspicion “must be based on 
commonsense judgments and inferences about human 
behavior.” Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125.  
 
In determining whether there was reasonable suspicion 
to seize Whitfield, we may consider everything that occurred 
until the moment he was seized, which it is not disputed was 
when he was grabbed by Rivera. One factor that may be 
considered is his failure to have complied with the officers’ 
orders.2 Valentine, 232 F.3d at 359. A failure to follow orders 
does not alone, however, give rise to reasonable suspicion. 
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991). 
 
 B. The District Court’s Decision 
 The District Court denied Whitfield’s motion to 
suppress in an oral opinion on February 27, 2009, and 
supplemented that ruling on March 19, 2009, stating that the 
issue was “a close call” and that “any change in the facts here 
could very well have changed the result.” (R. at 10.) The 
Court concluded that Whitfield was seized when Rivera 
grabbed him “after the failed attempt to get him to stop,” and 
that it had reviewed “all of the collective knowledge of the 
officers up to the point of the seizure.” (Id. at 11.) 
 
 The District Court credited Redd’s testimony that he 
believed that the closed fist hand-to-hand exchange he saw 
between Whitfield and Langston in the “drug set” was 
suspicious. The Court stated that “guns and drugs go 
 
2 Whitfield argues that we should not consider his 
failure to follow orders because the orders were invalid. This 
argument fails for two reasons: (1) Redd had reasonable 
suspicion before he ordered Whitfield to do anything, and (2) 
Fourth Amendment issues potentially arise not when the 
police issue an order but rather when a person is seized by 
submitting to an order or the police exert physical force.  
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together.” (Id. at 12.) Moreover, the Court found that 
Langston and Whitfield moved away from each other and the 
corner “in what appear[ed] to be a reaction to the presence of 
the police” and specifically noted Redd’s testimony regarding 
Whitfield “looking around” and his “furtive gestures, typical 
of an individual now confronted with police officers, looking 
for a way out.” (Id. at 12-13.) Nonetheless, said the Court, 
Whitfield’s conduct up to that point was “consistent with 
innocent behavior,” and “[p]eople should be able to greet one 
another [by shaking hands or “fist bump[s]”] and part 
company without being stopped by the, seized by the police.” 
(Id. at 13.)  
 
But then, the District Court continued, Whitfield put 
his hand in his pocket “with the furtive gesture” and in an 
“apparent effort to protect something,” and emphasized 
Whitfield’s refusal to stop or take his hand out of his pocket. 
(Id.) The Court concluded that the officers had reasonable 
suspicion due to “the presence in the evening hours after 9:00 
o’clock [sic] in a high crime area where there’s been drug 
transactions, arrests for drug transactions, shootings, what 
appears to be a hand-to-hand exchange, followed by a 
movement away from one another, and from the officers, the 
furtive gestures looking for a way out, insertion of the hand in 
the pocket in an effort to conceal something or secure 
something, refusal to stop, [and] refusal to show hands.” (Id. 
at 14.) 
 
C. The Officers had Reasonable Suspicion3 
 Whitfield contends that because Rivera grabbed him 
first we may look only to the facts that Rivera himself knew 
in determining whether there was reasonable suspicion to 
seize Whitfield. (See, e.g., Appellant’s Br. at 14 (“At the time 
Sergeant Rivera physically grabbed Whitfield, the facts 
 
3 Whitfield argues that the District Court 
“substitute[ed] a general suspicion standard for the requisite 
particularized suspicion standard.” (Appellant’s Br. at 10.) 
Given the Court’s discussion of the particular events on April 
30, 2008, we reject that argument without further discussion. 
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known to him did not establish reasonable, articulable 
suspicion that Whitfield was involved in criminal activity.”).) 
He argues that what is commonly known as the “collective 
knowledge doctrine” – under which the knowledge of one law 
enforcement officer is imputed to the officer who actually 
conducted the seizure, search, or arrest – should not apply to 
the seizure at issue here.4   
 
 We have not yet applied the collective knowledge 
doctrine to a Terry seizure in a precedential opinion, but we 
have applied it in other Fourth Amendment contexts. In 
United States v. Belle, 593 F.2d 487, 497 n.15 (3d Cir. 1979), 
for example, we flatly stated that “[t]he collective knowledge 
of the investigating officers is measured in determining 
probable cause” for an arrest. In United States v. Menon, 24 
F.3d 550, 562 (3d Cir. 1994), we held that agents properly 
seized documents under the plain view doctrine and that “the 
immediate apparency of criminality should be measured, at a 
minimum, by the collective knowledge of the officers on the 
scene.”  
 
Other courts of appeals have applied the collective 
knowledge doctrine to Terry seizures as well as in other 
Fourth Amendment contexts. See, e.g., United States v. Cook, 
277 F.3d 82, 86 (1st Cir. 2002) (“Here, common sense 
suggests that, where law enforcement officers are jointly 
involved in executing an investigative stop, the knowledge of 
each officer should be imputed to others jointly involved in 
executing the stop.”); United States v. Ledford, 218 F.3d 684, 
689 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that in the probable cause 
analysis it did not matter which of several officers actually 
opened a car trunk and that “[b]ecause the search was a joint 
endeavor, the court may properly consider” what other 
officers knew). Whitfield fails to cite – and we have not 
found – any court of appeals that has held to the contrary.  
 
 
4 Whitfield cites only United States v. Ramirez, 473 
F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2007), to support his argument and only 
that part of the opinion that discussed application of the 
doctrine in a scenario inapposite here. 
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It would make little sense to decline to apply the 
collective knowledge doctrine in a fast-paced, dynamic 
situation such as we have before us, in which the officers 
worked together as a unified and tight-knit team; indeed, it 
would be impractical to expect an officer in such a situation 
to communicate to the other officers every fact that could be 
pertinent in a subsequent reasonable suspicion analysis. 
Applying the collective knowledge doctrine here, there is 
little question that there was reasonable suspicion to seize 
Whitfield.  
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Because the District Court correctly concluded that 
there was reasonable suspicion to seize Whitfield, the 
judgment of the Court will be affirmed.  
 
